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Honorable J. W. Fulbright, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to reply further to your letter of
June 26 concerning a series of questions on SALT.

Attached are answers to those questions for inclusion
in the hearing record.

Sincerely yours,

David M. Abshire
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Attachment:

As stated.

PM/DCA:Martin 7/14/72

H:GWinnett:bj 7/19/72

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 26, 1972

#10

The Honorable David M. Abshire
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

ACTION
is assigned to

P. W.

Dear Mr. Abshire:

Senator Percy has submitted the attached questions for Secretary Rogers and Dr. Smith to be answered for inclusion in the record of the June 17 hearing.

A prompt response is important. As you are aware, the Committee will be pressed for time in completing its work on the proposed treaty limiting anti-ballistic missiles and the interim agreement on offensive weapons.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. Fulbright
J. W. Fulbright
Chairman

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6-29-72

Deadline requested
attached in RS/AN
Enclosures

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Enclosure 1

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY
TO BE ANSWERED BY SECRETARY ROGERS FOR THE RECORD OF THE HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON THE PROPOSED TREATY LIMITING ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES
AND THE PROPOSED INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

1. Could you describe the situation we would face in the absence of these agreements?
2. It has taken more than three years of concerted effort to produce the two agreements before us. Could the terms have been substantially improved, or the coverage broadened, if we had kept at the negotiating table longer? What real disadvantages could have resulted from continuing the negotiations?
3. How important was the President's visit to Moscow in terms of actually producing the final agreements? Could they have been accomplished without his presence there?
4. What is the relationship between the SALT agreements and the Joint Declaration of Principles? Is the latter the symbol of the intent to carry out the agreements in good faith?
5. Article XIII of the ABM treaty, which provides for the Standing Consultative Commission, may consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the treaty. Could this be interpreted as providing methods of consultation to deal with changes in the strategic situation brought about by China and that the Chinese may read any US-USSR anti-China purpose in this commission?
6. Did Chinese concerns as to the possible impact on their own security of a US-Soviet SALT agreement in any way inhibit our negotiation procedures or presentation of proposals?
7. Did we keep Japan as equally well informed as our NATO partners?
8. What has been the reaction of our major allies to the agreements?
9. One area of disagreement within the press and among some public figures has been the impact of the so-called "secret

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Enclosure 1

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clauses" to the SALT agreements; those understandings, interpretations and unilateral statements and safeguards, made available to this Committee by the Administration when it forwarded the treaty for consideration. What will prevent differing interpretations of these "clauses" from causing a major misunderstanding and hinder the successful implementation of the agreements?

10. Would it be safe to say that these clauses are really another form of safeguard particularly since they deal with such crucial areas as concealment, ABM technology advances, and missile modernization?

11. Will these clauses, other than the unilateral statements, have exactly the same force as if they were included in the text of the agreements?

12. Why were they not included in the texts?

13. What kind of impetus do you see these agreements giving to other arms control negotiations, such as test ban, CBW and conventional weapons, particularly in the conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva?

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Enclosure 2

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY
TO BE ANSWERED BY DR. SMITH FOR THE RECORD OF THE HEARINGS
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON THE PROPOSED TREATY LIMITING ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES
AND THE PROPOSED INTERIM AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

1. Since we both now have one ABM site, why in strategic terms should either side build a second?
2. Even if the Soviets went ahead and constructed a second ABM site, why would we have to build a second site around Washington?
3. On ABMs, is there any possibility that potential difficulties in identifying just what the specific purpose of a radar may be, by national means, could prohibit the construction of space activity or air defense related radars?
4. What was the rationale behind agreeing to Article VI of the treaty which prohibits the future deployment in third countries of early warning radars?
5. In view of our own acknowledgment as to the total number of ICBMs that we possess, why did we not insist on obtaining a similar public acknowledgment from the Soviets?
6. Did the Soviets ever indicate during the course of negotiations just what their estimated ICBM strength would be as of July 1, 1972, or are we relying completely on intelligence estimates?
7. Article XII, which deals with verification, and the non-interference therewith, also allows the continuation of current construction, assembly conversion and overhaul practices. Are there any such practices going on now within the Soviet Union, immune from our spy satellites? If there are, don't these constitute an obvious and potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty?
8. The Offensive Agreement does not cover forward based aircraft or heavy bombers, areas where we have a major advantage. In order to counter this advantage is it not likely that the

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Enclosure 2

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Soviets will continue to develop ever more formidable SAM systems, which because of their own complexity and advance technology could be a potential enlargement of the Soviet ABM system and which we might not be able to identify as such?

9. How important a consideration was the ability to use foreign submarine bases to us when we agreed to a numerically inferior relationship on SLBMs and modern nuclear subs?

10. The unilateral statements made by both sides and their reception by both sides could raise an interesting problem. Doesn't the Soviet statement referring to their right to increase the number of their SLBM submarines if our NATO allies increase their present deployment of such submarines in effect make the continuation of a bilateral agreement dependent on third party actions?

11. Further, doesn't this statement attempt to get us to restrain our allies in this area or commit us to the restriction on the transfer of offensive technology to them?

12. The SALT agreements appear to be a formal acceptance of a "stop where you are" position on launchers, radars, ABMs, etc. Neither we nor the Russians are going to dismantle any system other than the second ABM site we started at Malmstrom. Given this situation in the interim agreement, do you think that there is any possibility of negotiating rollbacks in the SALT II negotiations?

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